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6K E Y N O T E  A D D R E S S
Murray Gell-Mann
This meeting is concerned in great part with policy studies, with thinking about
the future of the human race and of the biosphere of the planet Earth. In looking
at the longer-term future, many of us might divide the various issues into cate-
gories such as military and diplomatic issues; or political issues, ideological
issues, environmental issues, human health and wellness issues, family issues,
demographic issues, economic issues, technological issues, governance issues,
issues of democracy and human rights, and so forth. 
It is natural when faced with a very complex system to try to break it up into
more manageable subsystems or aspects, defined in advance, that one hopes can
to some extent be studied or acted upon separately. That attempt is what the cat-
egories of issues represent. Trying to break up the world problématique in such a
way is natural and quite common. The difficulty is that understanding a non-
linear system, especially a complex one, by putting together descriptions of vari-
ous parts or aspects determined in advance, will work only if those parts or
aspects interact only weakly, so that the whole system is, in the technical jargon,
“decomposable.” But that is not true of the world problématique. No one has
found a way to decompose it into aspects that interact only weakly. 
In that sense, there is truth in the old adage that the whole is more than the
sum of its parts. Can we really separate environmental issues from those involv-
ing population growth? Can we consider these in isolation from technological
change or from economic policy, for example, charging the true costs of deci-
sions? Can we discuss issues of global governance without considering politics
in the various countries and regions or without treating the competition and
conflict among differing ideologies? If military and diplomatic policies fail, and
mankind is plunged into a hugely destructive war, can our other objectives be
attained? Probably not. Isn’t economic growth threatened by the widespread
prevalence of fatal or debilitating diseases? Can we separate off questions about
democracy and human rights even within issues of democracy and human
rights? What if democratic processes bring to power elements of society hostile
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to human rights and to tolerance, or to ones that favor environmental destruc-
tion or aggressive war? 
While separate consideration of the various aspects of the world situation is
necessary and desirable, perhaps according to those categories we just men-
tioned, it very badly needs to be supplemented by integrative thinking that not
only puts together the studies of various aspects, but also takes into account the
strong interactions among them.
For such an effort to succeed, some kind of simplification is naturally
required. Certain things have to be treated in a cursory fashion, and others in
more detail. But that process, what physical scientists would call “coarse grain-
ing,” cannot be accomplished by the categories established in advance because
they interact with one another too strongly. If you take a coarse grain picture,
you see only a relatively blurry image at a certain length scale, but at a larger
length scale, you can actually see things, so you are averaging over things at a
short length scale. The coarse graining cannot be accomplished through the cat-
egories established in advance; it has to follow from the nature of the world sys-
tem that we are supposed to be studying, the world system itself. The necessary
coarse graining has to be discovered—it can’t be imposed at the beginning just
because we have a lot of traditional categories. Think about the relation between
weather and climate. No clear results will follow from trying to examine the
weather at each little place and each short interval of time and neglecting the
strong interaction with other phenomena.
Scenarios come in bundles, which split into smaller bundles at the special
points where chance has a huge effect, or where major transitions occur. Does
thinking about such near singularities help? Does it help us to identify occasions
of great leverage with respect to the future? Probably yes. However, decisions
about the future of the world are not made by any elite group of thinkers. They
involve a great variety of actors all over the globe, and in the end, it is the nature
of those actors that matters most, not the thinking about the future on the part
of an intellectual elite. What will happen to human nature in the longer-range
future? That may be the most important question of all. Will it be changed artifi-
cially through the application of science and technology? Will it be gradually
Keynote Address
8modified by culture as it has been in the past? If so, how? For example, will devo-
tion to one’s own country or ethnic group or religion be supplemented by a kind
of planetary consciousness that defines “us” to include the whole human race,
and maybe even to some extent the other organisms with which we share the
biosphere? Or will human cussedness continue and lead us into disasters made
worse by our continuing advances in technology? Perhaps speculation about the
longer-range future can be of some help in the seizing of opportunities and in
avoiding some of the worst catastrophes. Anyway, we can hope so. 
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S E S S I O N  O N E
Long-Term Policy Analysis
James Dewar
First off, by long-term, what we really mean is characterized by deep uncertainty.
In a more technical sense, we mean characterized by structural uncertainty. If
your uncertainty is parametric, you know basically how the system works but
you don’t know what numbers to plug in. If you don’t even know how the system
works necessarily, then you think of that as structural or deep uncertainty. Long-
term in the sense of long-term planning has gotten a bad name because long-
term doesn’t quite cut it. We called it long-term, but what we really mean is deep
uncertainty.
If we think about long-term policy analysis in the context of short-term pol-
icy analysis, here are the five canonical steps to short-term policy analysis for
developing some kind of optimal or sound policy. You set the context, you gener-
ate alternative policies, you project the consequences of those alternatives, you
value those projections, and you pick the best one. As you get farther out in time,
it is still not hard to set the context or generate alternatives, but it gets harder to
project the consequences. Not only that, it gets harder to value those projections.
The whole enterprise of trying to develop a single optimal policy in the longer-
range is much more questionable. 
There is one other thing I want to talk about in terms of what to do and
when to do it. This is kind of a notional three-dimensional box . . . [Think in terms
of] complexity low to high, uncertainty well-characterized to deep, and policy
options few or many. “Few” would be on the order of build it or don’t build it;
“many” would be kind of a wide-open problem. Where the problem tends to be
reasonably well-characterized, then you have got a lot of techniques for optimal
decisions no matter how many policy options there are or what the complexity is.
As long as the situation is reasonably well-characterized, you are in good shape
with a lot of the short-term policy analysis techniques. If the situation is not too
complex, then you can go well out in uncertainty and policy options and use
techniques like scenario planning to help you think about the few sorts of plausi-
ble futures that you want to worry about. 
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This long-term policy analysis method for doing robust decision-making,
you can now read in the April 2005 Scientific American. It is another tool that we
are trying to bring to the table to help with long-term policy analysis.
Response
Adil Najam
Whenever I hear “long-term” my first reaction is to think of Keynes and his won-
derful line, “In the long-term we are all dead,” though given current action, in the
long-term more people might be dead than might otherwise have been. 
A couple of things that I thought were important relate to what long-term
policy planning is not: that it should not be confused with long-term future pro-
jection, which is a part of long-term policy analysis. It is not necessary to get
your predictions entirely right to do good policy analysis, and that relationship
ought to be made clear, because if not made clear, there are a whole set of people
who are going to be turned off by this exercise in looking into the glass ball for
the future.
What do we know about long-term policy analysis? We know that short-
term decisions can and do have long-term policy implications, sometimes
intended, very often unintended, unanticipated. We do know that people have
tried to historically and continue to try to influence long-term decisions with
their short-term policy. We do know that these efforts have generally not been as
successful as those people might have hoped.
Lastly, how do we do long-term policy analysis? You had two ways that you
highlighted that I thought were good. First, what are the long-term implications
of short-term actions? Second, what are the short-term actions needed to reach
long-term goals? There may also be a third category: i.e., putting in place long-
term changes to respond to what I think the future might look like. This is very
fashionable in many countries. For example, Japan does wonderful reports like
Japan 2100. This is not just about what do I do now to create the 2100 I want, but
what do I see 2100 being and how do I prepare myself to get ready for things that
are likely to happen independent of my actions. It seems to me that there is a lot
of long-term policy analysis that also happens there.
LOOKING AHEAD: Forecasting and Planning
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S E S S I O N  T W O
Forecasting for Business
Anita McGahan
Three questions that were of central interest were suggested to me: Who is doing
this in business? That is, who is thinking about forecasting over a 35–200 year
horizon? How are they doing it? Is this a useful and legitimate practice?
Who is doing this? Everyone and no one. Basically, on a 35–200 year horizon,
forecasting for business is extremely challenging. In fact, there is a set of theo-
ries regarding a financial structure of publicly traded stocks that would suggest
that a 35-year horizon is not terribly relevant to current performance, yet clearly
the same theory suggests that the financial market value of these firms depends
on forecasting cash flow.
The idea here is that in theory—and, in large part, in practice—the stock
price of a firm ought to incorporate current information about the long-term
health of firms, and that what really matters for stock prices will change with
those forecasts. To make matters worse, not only is the time horizon so long
(35–200 years), but the best possible information about what will happen in busi-
ness in 35 years ought to be already incorporated in the stock pricing. If you are
interested in stock prices, what really matters are changes in these conditions.
We are looking at second-order effects as opposed to first-order effects and try-
ing to incorporate information about the long-term future into stock valuation,
which is what executive management is entrusted to do on behalf of investors.
Surprises or news about the long-term future, 35–200 years out, are often viewed
as pretty rare or unreliable. As a result, most firms do not invest on such a long-
term horizon.
What are the likely dominant models for successful commercialization of
technologies that are relevant to these long-term trends? It is very difficult to
envision a forecasting model that could accurately describe which firms would
benefit from research that yields technology of commercial value 35–200 years
out. It is very difficult to predict which ones from today’s field will survive to be
leaders in the 35–200 year future.
Session Two
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The final question that I was asked to address: is forecasting over a 35–200
year horizon useful and legitimate? People like me, business academics, would
say yes and no. Forecasting is essential to value and essential to survival. It moti-
vates innovation. But forecasting accurately is very difficult for business. There
are some industries in which technological, demographic, social and other
trends are critical, and where this practice of long-term forecasting is more rele-
vant and perhaps I might even use the words “more legitimate,” to borrow lan-
guage here. 
On the other hand, most business people would say no. Innovation depends
on flexibility. Keep in mind that most companies don’t live that long. I saw statis-
tics that Americans move, on average, every six years to take new jobs. Executive
horizons are not on a 35+-year term, yet it takes a long time to change a corpo-
rate culture. Flexible innovation is very difficult to predict, but forecasting and
coming up with surprises is essential to creating value, and sometimes that does
require a long horizon. 
Response
Zachary Karabell
If you’re thinking about how you can get business forecasting into businesses, I
don’t see any reasonable horizon whereby long-term thinking, per se, becomes
part of a business strategy because there are too many factors mitigating
against that. If we could get businesses to think in terms of five years, that
would be an accomplishment. The problem is that when you have people who are
dedicated to thinking about the future in an organization, they often have very
fun jobs and they often are very quirky people, but the organization usually
hates them or doesn’t respect them because they don’t add any value. Why are
these people being paid to sit around and think about the future when I’ve got to
meet my quarterly numbers?
What you can do, if you have got a group of people who are thinking in this
long-range, who bring in academic knowledge at its best—academic in its good
form, not academic in its obscurantism form—the things that they point to help
individuals within a corporate culture think more clearly about the implications
LOOKING AHEAD: Forecasting and Planning
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of the business as it is currently construed, such that they make adjustments
that lead the business to continue to be more successful. Then you can show that
there is some value in longer-range thinking for whoever is around 35 years
later. Does that long-range thinking help that organization make better deci-
sions in the present? I think that is clearly possible as an incentive structure.
However, it is very rare that organizations do this. I think these are really impor-
tant things to think about in a business context, but the incentive structures
don’t favor such thinking. Also, it is very different to think long-term if you are
an individual entrepreneur thinking about your own business than a corporate
institution thinking about its ongoing business flow.
Session Two
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Forecasting for Investment
Ian Bremmer
First the broad ideas: Why do I think the world, from an investment perspective,
is becoming a riskier place? I think it’s important to separate things that are
variables and things that are drivers. A variable is something that may or may
not happen with a sort of reasonable estimate over the period of time that we are
looking at . . .Oil prices at $25, $50, or $100 is a variable. There are other issues
like demographic change which are investment drivers. 
Three factors of globalization that are impacting markets and investors
more over time: first, the diffusion of dangerous technologies; second, the com-
munications revolution; third, the porosity of borders. I consider those drivers. I
don’t consider those trends. They are drivers that have some significant impact
because they tend to make rogue states, rogue organizations, and even rogue
individuals more of a potential threat to global markets. There is also of course
the reaction to that driver, as we have seen. This is more of a variable, but still
one that will probably have significant implications in slowing down economic
growth in places. That is the tighter security on borders, and accordingly the dif-
ficulty in the trade-off between security and economy that we see in the United
States as well as in Europe and as a consequence even in the Middle East. 
Response
William Grimes
Ian has presented a couple of points that seem to be important in the model.
One: this has to do with the stability of the political system itself. Iran is proba-
bly a little bit more potentially stable than some of the other major oil producing
states, perhaps. You have a rule of law; you have a political system that has been
in place for 25 years; you have an unhappy generation, but hey, who doesn’t have
an unhappy younger generation? You also have a fairly consistent rulership; you
have a reasonably sized middle-class and a reasonably well-educated population.
The types of major political change that we would imagine are going to be a little
LOOKING AHEAD: Forecasting and Planning
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bit less severe than, say, in Liberia. One aspect has to do with the political stabil-
ity of the state. 
The other aspect has to do with the external environment. The North Korea
issue, when you talk about the impact on South Korea, the problem is not that
South Korea is such an important member of the international diplomatic com-
munity. The problem is that South Korea is a very highly integrated member of
the world economy. Globalization, to the extent that it is happening in a given
area, is going to potentially increase the impact on the system of a major shock. 
Session Three
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S E S S I O N  F O U R
Mapping the Global Future: NIC Global Trends 2020
Matthew Burrows
In terms of our understanding, what were the major findings? First and foremost,
a more fluid and complicated set of international alignments than at anytime
since at the end of the Second World War. . . and the higher level of uncertainty. It
is related, again, to two different phenomena. One is globalization and how that
is generating unprecedented prosperity but also an enormous amount of uneven-
ness of the prosperity. It is also putting pressures on democratic as well as
authoritarian regimes because of the spread of new communications technolo-
gies. That is one element that makes us very uncertain. Then you combine it with
the second, which is the emergence of China and India as major economic pow-
ers. Either of these two phenomena are profound, but the combination of the two
makes things almost unprecedented. That is why we began the study by empha-
sizing that we are in a period of unprecedented uncertainty.
One of the other findings is that we don’t foresee great power conflict in this
next period. That doesn’t mean that we don’t see conflict. In part because of glob-
alization, we foresee that there would be greater efforts towards conflict resolu-
tion once power conflict breaks out. That is probably one of the big good new
stories we have in the study. Finally, we find that there is the possibility of a
major ideological conflict or a transmutation of the terrorist threat as we con-
ceive it now into much more of an ideological struggle. 
I would like to talk a little bit about the methodology. With this study we
wanted to get out from behind our desks in Langley, but also outside of the US.
For the first time we went out having conferences outside the US with regional
experts, looking at how they saw their own regions, asking them particularly to
talk about their own regional scenarios. One of the things we found when we did
this is that there are now a number of cells in other governments around the
world who are beginning to try to grapple with strategic analysis. Within our
own government, I would say that over the past four or five years there has been
progress in trying to internalize some of the lessons and some of the techniques
that we have used and others have used on long-range forecasting. I will just
LOOKING AHEAD: Forecasting and Planning
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mention one that we are heavily involved in today. That is an effort to try to pre-
vent outbreaks of conflict and understand the indicators that would warn us of
impending problems in countries. I think the EU also has a beginning of a strate-
gic effort along those same lines. 
Response
Ralph Buultjens
The purpose of this, as Matthew said, is to stimulate thinking. In that sense, I
thought that it was not very imaginative. The scenarios which are the center-
piece of this—that is, “Davos World,” “Pax Americana,” “A New Islamic Revival,”
“Cycle of Fear”—are what exist already. We don’t have to look to 2020 to see these
things operating. We are living in a world deeply influenced by those things right
now. I would have preferred some kind of more imaginative thing; for example,
what would happen if there were an economic union in Northeast Asia: China,
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Some might laugh at that. It is highly unlikely
historically, but then in 1945 we laughed at a Franco-German-based common
market. I would like to see some greater leaps in that sense.
My second comment is this: a lot of attention was given, as Matthew said, to
China and India. That is correct, and almost everybody does that now. The future
belongs to Asia. Here I see the danger of the Tom Friedman fallacy, or what I call
the 5 percent seduction. That is to say, analysts look at 5 percent of China and
India, roaring successes, dazzled by it, and extrapolate from that. They tend to
forget that China and India are still enormously poor countries with a few stun-
ning highlights, and the big question to me is whether this 5 percent will be able
to lift the other 95 percent upward and sustain that for a long period of time. It is
not so much whether the 5 percent will disturb the world, it is whether the 5 per-
cent can have an impact on the 95 percent, for these are now increasingly more
and more two nations within one nation-state. 
Finally, I would like some discussion of what are the real big booby-traps in
the next 15 years. That is, what is the single greatest danger in terms of econom-
ics? I would suggest that it is the sudden collapse of the US dollar. What is the
single greatest threat in terms of security? I would suggest that is a really cata-
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strophic terrorist attack. There has been only one catastrophic attack in history:
the World Trade Center. In terms of politics, I would join with Ian Bremmer in
saying that a single greatest threat is the collapse overnight of Saudi Arabia.
Examining the next 15 years in terms of a single threat in different areas—that
is, what is the most dangerous thing—would also, I think, add something to this.
Let me close with a thought. As the contradictions in our world deepen, how long
can they coexist without major explosions? Will those come in the next 15 years?
Or perhaps they can exist in the next 15 years, one balancing the other. After all,
it was Charles Dickens who reminded us that at one and the same time, we can
have the best of times and the worst of times.
LOOKING AHEAD: Forecasting and Planning
for the Longer-Range Future
19
S E S S I O N  F I V E
Planning a Foreign Policy
Philip Bobbitt
As Jim Lindsey among others has proposed, I think we should explore a global
alliance of democratic states. Such a group would unite nations with entrenched
democratic traditions such as Canada, South Korea, the US, the European Union,
Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Costa Rica, Botswana, Israel, India, many states.
Membership would be open to countries where democracy is so rooted that rever-
sion to autocratic rule is unthinkable. Its model would be, ironically, NATO,
because NATO was a regional organization responding to regional threats.
Global threats require some kind of global organization. The US could, I think,
take a leap with the European Union and others in creating such an alliance. We
should reach out to new states with incentives to join that alliance, among them,
debt cancellation, when they satisfy the criteria of the Peace of Paris. I think we
can extend our influence beyond our temporary hegemony if we take this
moment to join with others in crafting a system of rules that is compatible with
our understanding of state responsibility for humanitarian well-being, including
the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and under-
writing the creation of the institutions that serve civil societies. I would say,
third, creating an alliance of democracy ought to be an objective in future US for-
eign policy.
For Americans, the formulation of foreign policy in the 20th century oscil-
lated between the universalistic rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson, which would have
superimposed an American system of law on the states, and a particularistic
worldview of Theodore Roosevelt as more strategic and hegemonic. I don’t think
anybody doubts why Kennan, like George W. Bush, came down to this debate. I
quote: “Universalistic, and the particularized approaches to the solution of inter-
national problems: the universalistic approach works to a solution of interna-
tional problems by providing a pattern of rules which would apply to all
countries. It favors the legalistic solutions,” and in Kennan’s hands, there was no
harsher adjective than “legalistic,” such as those embodied in the UN. This
approach has a strong appeal to US foreign policy, for it appears to obviate the
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necessity of dealing with the national peculiarities and diverging political
philosophies of foreign peoples, which our people tend to find confusing, irritat-
ing . . .We cannot preserve international law by preserving the international law
of the 20th century, but we can rewrite that law to be sensitive to the security
concerns of the 21st. Fundamentally, a new international law will be expressed in
two propositions that the community of states must press for: a set of double
standards in international relations, to put that provocatively, applying different
rules to its members with respect to the use of force, than those rules applied to
other states. The 21st-century state, the British diplomat Robert Cooper has writ-
ten, “needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, some
states cannot bring the basis of law and open, transparent security, and have
been dealing with other states outside this consensus. We must revert to the
rougher methods of an earlier period: forces, preemptive attack, deception, what-
ever is necessary for those who live in the 19th-century world of every state for
itself. In the jungle, they use the law of the jungle.”
Response
David Fromkin
Rather than give a response, I just want to make a few comments about the sub-
ject that we are to address today, which is forecasting the future and planning
for it. Two things: forecasting and planning. The first, forecasting, de Tocqueville
famously predicted in the 19th century that the 20th century would be domi-
nated by a conflict of the two great powers, Russia and the United States, the
United States standing for the cause of freedom and Russia standing for the
cause of tyranny. That is a prediction often cited to show that you really can pre-
dict the future. It seems to me, the fact that we have just one such forecast,
shows not how possible it is, but how very difficult it is to forecast the future.
That brings me back to George Kennan’s proposal of containment, in partic-
ular in the “X” article in Foreign Affairs. In seeing that on the one hand, his pre-
diction was flawed, because he said 10 or 15 years, and in these things, time is of
the essence, it was 45 years before the Soviet Union fell. He was right, but not
right on. Then, if we look at the forecasting that this was going to come about as
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the result of a crisis of passage of the regime there too, that wasn’t why it went.
Flawed both as a forecast, flawed as a plan for what to do based on the forecast,
and yet it is one of the rare examples of something that was, in a sense, right.
What I have been meditating about is how very difficult it is to do the thing
that we talked about in the title of this session, which is to figure out what is
going to happen in the future and then also figure out what the right thing is to
do about it.
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S E S S I O N  S I X
Forecasting Global Transitions as a Tool for Planning
Barry Hughes
I am going to focus on the International Futures computer simulation, which is a
tool for thinking about the future. It is only one tool; it is only a very partial tool.
As a developer of a quantitative simulation and data analysis tool like this, I am
always one of the first to point out the limitations of these and the way they need
to be used in the context of a much richer set of ways of thinking about the
future and planning for the future; but at the same time, it is my job as a quanti-
tatively oriented futurist to try to develop the strongest such tool that I can. I
keep working on it, I keep trying to enhance it. The version you are going to see
is called International Futures. 
What we are trying to do is look at a variety of interacting systems: demo-
graphic, economic, energy, agriculture, obviously technological drivers, environ-
mental constraints, sociopolitical, international political systems. There are
sub-modules in each one of these areas within the International Futures system
that are—for the most part—close to state-of-the-art, particularly in the case of
the demographic and economic forecasting modules, less so in the case of
energy, more so in terms of modeling some sociopolitical developments. They are
about as strong a simulation as you are going to find out there. We try to repre-
sent the structural elements of these systems: demographic, economic and so on.
We try to represent some basic stocks and flow characteristics. We try to repre-
sent the dominant relationships. What drives productivity change? What drives
democratization? What drives changes in the educational levels of populations,
the dominant relationships? Then the key dynamics: what are the relationships
across economic and demographic and sociopolitical systems? Very crude, but
again an attempt to do something along the lines of looking at the larger whole…  
I want to wrap up with a discussion of how we intervene in this system to
analyze these transitions in terms of scenarios: how we consider uncertainty
explicitly and how we explore for the potential that intervention and leverage
has within the systems. We have developed something of a scenario tree for the
International Futures, which allows us to intervene across a wide variety of
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levers within the system. The first two categories are technological change and
key environmental uncertainties. How fast will productivity increase with respect
to energy? How fast will energy demand, energy usage productivity, improve?
How fast will the multifactor productivity of a variety of countries around the
world and Europe vs. China vs. the United States improve? Environmental uncer-
tainties: What is the ultimate resource base? At what point will global fisheries
peak out and begin to decline? 
Those are the kinds of things you can intervene with alternative assump-
tions around technological change and environmental uncertainties. We create
what we call framing scenarios with those kinds of interventions. Those are the
big-picture framing uncertainties. Inside those, we create intervention pat-
terns . . .When we intervene, we pick a particular lever; we pick a particular pat-
tern for the intervention. We can put these together into larger scenarios like
IPCC scenarios, the NIC 2020 scenarios, the Global Scenario Group scenarios.
We package these, they are available to the user to explore. They can see our
interventions, they can see the assumptions behind the scenario, they can
change those scenarios. 
Where are we going to go next with this kind of tool? I think that the places
we want to go next are in the same kinds of categories I talked about earlier. We
need always to continue developing the structures of the model, the data and the-
ory foundations of them. We need to improve our formulations for various
dynamic linkages . . .We need to continue to increase the accessibility and the
user-friendliness of this system. We need to develop strategy search analysis
tools, and this is where the CARS System of RAND could be particularly useful. If
you could take this kind of model and you can run it hundreds of thousands of
times with different interventions and you can explore the entire space of possi-
ble futures and find robust opportunity preserving strategies to address some of
these problems that are suggested by these major transitions, you have some
suggestions as to the kinds of interventions we might want to recommend to
decision makers. We hope to be able to do this among other places in looking at
the human condition over the next 25–50 years. 
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Response
Cutler Cleveland
When I look at this model, I say ok, what we are essentially seeing over this
period of time is an increase by a factor of 5 or 11 in the output of material stuff
on the planet. I think back to what we have done in the last 150 years, when we
essentially did the same thing. We transformed one-third of the non-ice land sur-
face of the planet into human existence. We increased the concentration of car-
bon dioxide from 270 to 380 parts per million. We now have a period of
extinction of biodiversity which we haven’t seen since the dinosaurs left us. So I
look at this forecast of doing this again in a material sense and ask, what are the
underlying energy and environmental implications of this? I think that the
model addresses some of them but I think that it could be improved to address
some of the things that aren’t addressed.
One of the things, a general issue that really was raised in our earlier ses-
sion over lunch, is that you always see in these types of models very smooth
curves, things going smoothly, but there are discontinuities. One of the things on
the energy and environmental and economic front was, what if you smack the
system with something really abrupt, like a really severe oil price shock, worse
than the one that happened in 1980 and ’81, which plunged the entire world into
recession for two years? 
Overall, I think this effort is one of the more sophisticated, certainly one of
the most ambitious modeling efforts out there. As a teaching tool, I would urge
those of you who teach in these areas to have your students look at these models
because they are great pedagogical tools. 
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S E S S I O N  S E V E N
Forecasting for Defense
Andrew Bacevich
What I’m going to talk about is my understanding of how the military attempts
to envision its future. The bottom line is, not terribly successfully, and I’ll try to
suggest a couple of reasons why I think that is the case. 
If there is a distinctive approach that the military takes (because they do all
kinds of things to forecast the future), it seems to me that that distinctive
approach is summed up in the word war-gaming. There is an ancient tradition of
war games. War games come in various forms. They offer different levels of
fidelity; the range of costs varies dramatically. They also serve different pur-
poses. These games postulate scenarios, they postulate adversaries with either
certain existing or emerging capabilities; put them in some sort of a competitive
scenario and they provide a way to guide discussion about systems design and
procurement, about budgetary priorities, and also help to provide some focus
about questions of doctrine and organization. It is important to know that these
future-looking war games can focus on the different levels of war. There can be
tactical war games that are really concerned with what the battle is going to look
like; there can be operational war games that really are concerned with the struc-
ture and the conduct of campaigns; and of course, there are strategic war games,
war games that infect and intrude into the political level of war.
If there is so much effort invested in war-gaming, why does it seem to be so
difficult for military institutions—and the one that I’m most interested in is the
US military—why is it so difficult to figure out what is going to happen out there
in the future? There are a number of factors involved, I think. One is that these
are great big bureaucracies. There is simply the weight of institutional inertia.
What we did yesterday seems to be pretty good, so that’s what we’re going to do
tomorrow. . .
Moreover, here is my last point. I’m struck by the extent to which within the
military, and perhaps this is true in other professions as well, the here and now
really does tend to take precedence over the future. The pressing concerns of the
moment, particularly concerns that have operational implications or have impli-
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cations for who is going to live and who is going to die and who is going to win
and who is going to lose. Therefore, even as they speculate about the future, the
members of the Officer Corps tend actually to be concerned much more about
winning the war tomorrow, that they think is going to be like the war they fought
yesterday, rather than genuinely investing themselves in the war that is going to
happen ten years from now or twenty years from now. Let me give you the excep-
tion that proves the rule: Vietnam. Vietnam, this institutional disaster as far as
the US military is concerned, induces a reaction that says in this one particular
case, “No, the war of tomorrow will not be like the war of yesterday, because we
ain’t never going to fight that kind of war again. We refuse to fight that kind of
war again.” Therefore the military reform effort that comes out of Vietnam is
explicitly designed to avoid the prospect of future insurgencies and postulated a
war that was very much like the wars they used to know and like. That is to say,
conventional wars fought against advanced adversaries in places like Europe. 
I think that is going on today. If anybody follows defense literature, you
know there is an enormous amount of discussion about military revolutions and
transformation and radical change and all that sort of thing. I know that the peo-
ple who sponsor these ideas are serious about them. I for one am not at all con-
vinced that the institutions are serious about embracing or even looking at these
notions in any great depth. 
Again, I concur with these recommendations, but these are recommenda-
tions that come not from a concerted effort to take into account all sorts of fac-
tors so we can understand what war is going to look like 20 years from now;
these are lessons that people picked up after action reports, or frankly, read in
the New York Times, and said, “What’s going on now and what should we do
about it?” My argument is that this is a recurring phenomenon. This is a demon-
stration of how the needs of the moment trump any concerns about 20 years
from now and therefore make forecasting military futures very difficult.
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Response
H. Joachim Maitre
Andy, in another conversation just a few days ago, mentioned the crash of the 
C-130 transport aircraft in Albania, and asked what the Air Force was doing in
Albania. Good point, isn’t it? Albania is not a member of NATO. I did some
research, called up the Air Force in Washington, and of course was told that
everything is classified. The aircraft had taken off at 10:30 pm from Tirana
Airport, had gone south, and had flown into a mountain 20 miles north of the
great border. That in itself is worth the question, what are we doing there? But of
course, I also found out that it was not a C-130, it was an MC-130H, which is
called Combat Talon, an aircraft which costs to procure $200 million per piece.
It’s a very expensive aircraft. What are we doing with this aircraft in Albania?
Well, it’s classified because we are involved in a global war on terror. We use that
particular phrase, a cliché by now, in order to be virtually everywhere in the
world. Estimates are that we are represented today in 140 countries. But what
are we doing this for? The answer again is in order to fight terror anywhere in
the world, no matter where it threatens us.
Threat scenarios. We live today in an age of intimidation of allies. You might
recall that not too long ago, our government commented on the unwillingness of
a neighbor to the north, namely Canada, to chip in on the procurement of ballis-
tic missile defense. The story goes, if North Korea launches an intercontinental
ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead towards Seattle, and it strays off course
and is now threatening Vancouver and British Columbia, we Americans will have
to bail them out. In other words, the Canadians are freeloaders, which they admit
to being, by the way. They simply say that we are 30 million people, we don’t con-
sider North Korea a military threat. Who does? If North Korea were indeed to
launch such a weapon, I think as realists we would say, “Do it. We’ll take care of
you after that.” So we do not discuss in our defense budget, which right now is in
the neighborhood of $400 billion a year, that we need threats in order to spend
the way we do. It used to be a leftist argument, but after the end of the Cold War,
we should readjust our threat scenarios to what we may call reality.
Session Seven
28
S E S S I O N  E I G H T
The EU as a Case Study of Planning: A Prospective Retrospective
Vivien Schmidt
The question is, how can we think about the EU as a planning project? To do this,
we have to project ourselves back into the early years. We need to consider the
original plan as an economic and political project and then proceed to the pres-
ent. This, I am going to do very quickly, talk about the ideas of the planners, the
treaties that institutionalized and constitutionalized this planning project, the
institutional structures that were created, the dynamics of the processes that fol-
lowed from these institutions’ words and ideas, the events that promoted plans
or demoted them, the new supplemental plans drafted in response to events, and
the limits to growth, or if you will, what happens when you realize, when you
actually have your plan.
In addition to needing good ideas and good texts, you need good institutions
set up by the plan. I have been quite amazed how surprisingly adaptable the
institutions were. The coal and steel community, the institutions set up there
translate quite beautifully first into the European Economic Community. You
had, in the first, the ECSC, a high authority. It becomes the Commission. The
Special Council of Ministers becomes the Council of Ministers. Common
Assembly becomes the Parliament. I’m not going to go on, but you just see that
really is a very good translation of the early institutional structures into what we
have. What you see over time is that it simply is a continued balancing. As the
Parliament gains power, the Commission gains power, but the intergovernmen-
tal body, the Council of Ministers, the member states, also maintain and gain
power as well. What you see is a ratcheting up of the powers of the EU, but also 
a balancing of all of this. Quite extraordinary in terms of seeing how all that
works. To be perfectly honest, I think the constitutional treaty, whatever the
problems, has been a brilliant solution because it rebalances everything, but also
ratchets up. More democracy, allegedly, with the Parliament having more power,
but okay. . .
There is another piece of this. The bicycle theory of the EU is that you need
momentum or you fail, which gets us to today, the realization of planning. What
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Session Eight
happens when the plan seems to have all been realized, or largely so? Where do
you go next? We have got some big questions for the EU now: what is its finalité ?
The next thing is, what is the EU? A super-state? I argue a regional state. It
can’t be a nation-state. It doesn’t have an identity, a common will, but it has got a
composite identity. Democracy: that is really the problem, because this is a
democracy that is not like other democracies. It is at best an indirect democracy.
The EU only has “for and with the people,” i.e. democracy through effective gov-
ernment and interest consultation. If people accepted that, fine, except they keep
thinking that you ought to be able to elect your representatives directly, because
after all, how are you going to throw the scoundrels out if you don’t elect them?
The problem for the EU is really the democracy thing right now. That is its major
crisis. 
There are all sorts of problems now as the EU has matured to a certain level.
It is a single currency zone, except for those who are a part of it, but even so, it
has a regional economy which is nevertheless highly differentiated, so not like
the US, not sort of a nation-state with a national economy. This is why I call it a
regional state with a regional economy. It works, but it doesn’t work the way a
nation-state does. The real challenge for the EU right now and in planning for
the future is, how do you reconcile national populations? How do you create
something? How do you make it clear that at the national level, you continue to
have what we think of as democracy—electoral democracy, participatory democ-
racy—and that at the EU level, it is pluralism? How do you get people to under-
stand that? That is the whole political piece. As long as, economically, the EU
continues, whatever the problems, it is the politics that people are going to focus
on. 
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Response
Renée Haferkamp
Well, Vivien has said many things, and in a very optimistic way. I have been for
my whole life in this adventure, and I must say that whatever our plans have
been, they have not very often been realized . . . I think this is a very democratic
structure, but the fact is that the member states do not want to lose any part of
sovereignty.
We still have to look for more. That is why I ask the question to Andy
Bacevich about the defense, because that is the real problem. But I think, and
there I agree with Vivien, that it is the only domain where we do make a lot of
progress. On foreign policy, Iraq has divided us so profoundly that I don’t see
that really over. If we have voted—you always think Europe was on one side
against the Americans, but no. If we had voted in the Council of Ministers among
the 15 countries, 8 were with the Americans, 7 against. That is why we didn’t
vote, because we wanted to look like our public opinion. That is true. The public
opinion, even in the countries with the United States—Spain, Italy, and Great
Britain—were very much opposed to the war. Anyway, foreign policy, that is the
real problem. We want to exist in the world and don’t know how to get our act
together, and how to be a sort of a counterweight to the only superpower, the
United States. 
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C L O S I N G  A D D R E S S
Sir Colin McColl
It is bizarre that in an age in which we pride ourselves on our knowledge and
sophistication and mastery of cutting-edge technology, we keep being hit on the
head by unexpected swinging sandbags. The trouble, I suspect, is that the pres-
sure of work makes policy makers, and therefore their support staff as well, con-
centrate on the problems of today. They simply do not have the time to deal with
the problems of tomorrow, many of which are simply regurgitations of the prob-
lems of yesterday. Once a problem has been patched up, it is put back on the
shelf and the focus turns elsewhere. When it suddenly explodes, we are all sur-
prised. Can we do things better? I believe we can. There is no panacea; there will
always be some nasty surprises, but we can surely reduce our vulnerability if we
keep a constant watch on specific dangers over the horizon, dangers which are
currently unfashionable, on possible crises which contradict current assump-
tions, on the likelihood of the unlikely. The key, to my mind, is to ask the right
questions and to use our imaginations, in doing so. This involves getting outside
the rails of policy and conventional wisdom because these points of view impose,
almost by their nature, a restrictive optimism. 
This whole analysis probably needs to be reviewed once a month. In this
review, one asks whether the weight of any of the drivers or restrainers has been
increased or diminished by new developments. One asks also whether there are
any new forces which have a bearing on the situation, and if so, such forces have
to be added to the chart with whatever value one judges suitable. A bonus to the
use of a graph of increasing likelihood or decreasing likelihood is that policy
makers are more likely to take preemptive action if they know that they may, in
the future, be asked why they did nothing when a graph available at the time
showed an inexorable rise in the likelihood of the event which they are being
asked to preempt. I have used this system spasmodically over the last few years. 
This system could, in theory, be used to look at the likelihood of nice rather
than nasty surprises, but I haven’t tried it in this more cheerful mode. It should
also, in theory, be applicable to questions about finance and markets, but I must
confess that I have not ventured beyond this use that involves some sort of politi-
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cal decision-making. I would, however, be delighted if someone more skilled than
I were to deploy a version of this technique to keep us up-to-date on, for instance,
questions such as, is there a hedge bubble? And if there is, to keep us posted on
when it is going to bust.
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